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The canonical text relating experience to knowledge for the philosophers of
the High Middle Ages was Aristotle’s Metaphysics A.1.1 The very first remarks
in First Philosophy describe how humans, after repeated exposure to the
world, come to have art and then science through experience: hominibus
autem scientia et ars per experientiam evenit (981a2–3: apobainei d’ episteˆmeˆ kai
techneˆ dia teˆs empeirias tois anthropois). Aristotle explains this process in terms
of cognitive capacities and their objects: sense, memory, and imagination
give rise to experience, which is directed to particulars; reason gives rise to
art and science, each directed to universals, the former being the exercise
of practical reason and the latter of speculative reason.2 So much is familiar.
Mediaeval philosophers who read Aristotle’s text generally followed his lead,
to the point where Robert Kilwardby, around the middle of the thirteenth
century, begins his explanation of the origin of the sciences by simply giv-
ing a close paraphrase of Metaphysics A.1 (De ortu scientiarum 1.8–11). The
philosophers of the High Middle Ages offered analyses of cognition whose
details, meant to flesh out Aristotle’s account, were elaborated in their de-
bates over the role of the agent intellect, the need for species in perception
and in thought, the reliability of the cognitive apparatus for induction, the
nature and function of memory, and so on.3
1. There are five mediaeval Latin translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: (i) James
of Venice’s partial translation from the Greek made in the twelfth century, the
vetustissima; (ii) an anonymous thirteenth-century revision of James’s translation,
the vetus; (iii) an anonymous twelfth-century translation from the Greek, the media;
(iv) Michael Scot’s translation from the Arabic, the nova, appearing along with his
translation of Averroe¨s’s “great commentary” on the Metaphysics and dating from
1220–1235; and (v) William of Moerbeke’s translation from the Greek, made some-
time before 1272, which apparently became the most widely used. I cite William’s
text in what follows unless noted otherwise.
2. There is a less detailed account in Posterior Analytics B.19 covering some of
the same ground; see also the Protrepticus (fr. 13 in Ross’s edition; B48 in Du¨ring’s
reconstruction).
3. The recent surveys in Katharine Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of
Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics 1250–1345, Studien und
Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Band 22. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988);
Leen Spruit, Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1994); and Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages. (Cambridge:
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Yet there is an alternative conception of experience also present in
Metaphysics A.1—a conception that does not lend itself readily to the reduc-
tive psychological analyses favored by Aristotle and many of his mediaeval
followers. Instead, obviating the need for Aristotle’s “leap to the universal”
through reason, experience is itself understood as a form of knowledge—
namely, competence in regard to some subject, a way of getting around in
the world. Recognizing this alternative paradigm allows us to see mediaeval
discussions of experience and knowledge in a new light, and furthermore
suggests a way of understanding the radical novelty of William of Ockham’s
turn away from species to habitual knowledge.
The first order of business, therefore, is to take a closer look at Aris-
totle’s discussion, distinguishing the traditional conception of experience
(Section I) from the alternative conception (Section II). Once these have
been clarified, I will examine mediaeval discussions of each, the former
when considering what role reason plays in experience (Section III); the
latter when considering experience as a competitor to art and science (Sec-
tion IV). I will then be in a position to describe and assess William of
Ockham’s contribution as an attempt to recast the traditional conception
of experience, and the questions it was meant to address, in light of the
alternative conception (Section V).
I. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE
Aristotle’s goal in Metaph. A.1 is to show that metaphysics, a form of wis-
dom (sapientia/sophia), is knowledge of the causes or principles of things
(981b27–28), a goal he follows up in A.2 by arguing that metaphysics
properly speaking is knowledge of the first causes or principles of things.
His procedure in A.1 is to trace the stages of cognition, from sense to
science, to see what can be known at each stage.4 The simplest animals
have only the power of sense—Albert the Great tells us they are shellfish,
who have the sense of touch alone (Metaph. 1.1.6)—however, most animals
have, in addition, memory and imagination (imaginatio/phantasia). Indeed,
as memory ‘arises’ (fit/gignetai) from sense, some animals with memory,
Cambridge University Press 1997), concentrate on intentionality and mental rep-
resentation; Peter King, “Scholasticism and the Philosophy of Mind: The Failure
of Aristotelian Psychology,” in Scientific Failure, ed. Tamara Horowitz and Allen I.
Janis. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 1994), pp. 109–38, focuses on mental
architecture.
4. See the division of the text in Aquinas’s In Metaph. 1.1.1, and his analysis of
the stages of cognition in 1.1.9–18. Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis in Metaphysicam
Aristotelis commentaria, editio iam a M.-R. Cathala, retractatur cura et studio Raymund
M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1950).
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depending on the senses they possess, can also be teachable (980a28–b25).5
Yet, while some animals live by memory and imagination, they ‘share little’
in experience: experimenti autem parum participant (980b25–26: empeirias de
metechei mikron). For humans, experience arises from memory, since “many
memories produce the capacity of a single experience” (980b28–29). Fur-
thermore, in the case of humans, art and science arise from experience
when, from many things understood in experience, there comes to be one
view universally applying to similar items: ex multis experientalibus conception-
ibus una fit universalis de similibus acceptio6 (981a5–7: hotan ek polloˆn teˆs empeirias
ennoeˆmatoˆn mia katholou geneˆtai peri toˆn homoioˆn hupoleˆpsis). This distinction
holds generally; experience is the cognition of singulars, whereas art is of
universals (981a16–17).
Aristotle’s remarks delineate a conception of experience that has be-
come traditional in philosophy: a buzzing, blooming confusion of sense-
impressions that, through repetition and memory, comprise the world as
understood by us; “we cannot go beyond experience,” as Hume is fond of
remarking, for it is the raw material of all our ideas, including our general or
abstract ideas. Aristotle’s conception is something very like the notion of ‘ex-
perience’ that seems to be at work in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
philosophy.7 Although its details are vague—do animals have experience?
how does experience arise from memory, or art and science from experi-
ence? do we experience objects, our sense-impressions, or our memories?
5. Aristotle claims that hearing is the relevant sense for being teachable; how-
ever, Albert argues that animals can learn through any communicative signs, e.g.,
a dog can be trained by head movements (Metaph. 1.1.6). (Albert, Metaphysica, text
in Alberti Magni opera omnia, ed. Berhardt Geyer et al., vol. 16 (Mu¨nster Westfalen:
Aschendorff, 1960).
6. So Moerbeke, the media, and the nova. James of Venice has ex multis experi-
mento intellectis universaliter una fit de similibus opinio, and the vetus has the intermediate
version ex multis experimento intellectis una fit universalis de similibus acceptio.
7. Locke and Hume use rather than analyze the notion of experience. Locke
comes the closest to providing an account of it when he writes:
Whence has [the mind] all the materials of reason and knowledge? To
this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge
is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation
employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal
operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that
which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.
(Essay 2.1.2)
Hume, inquiring into our ideas of cause and effect, declares:
The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent
instances of the existence of one species of objects; and also remember,
that the individuals of another species of objects have always attended
them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession
with regard to them . . . (Treatise 1.3.6)
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and so on—this traditional conception has exercised a power over the
philosophical imagination.
It has two features worth remarking. First, it is a mentalist account: expe-
rience is “in the head,” a function or product of the operation of cognitive
faculties, either singly or in combination; in Metaph. A.1, Aristotle mentions
sense, memory, and imagination as candidates for the job. Second, it is
reductionist: experience is explained in terms of these cognitive faculties, so
that our experience of the world is ‘constructed’ in some fashion from their
operation. As outlined above, Aristotle takes experience to be generated
from (repeated) sense-impressions, or, more precisely, he takes it to be the
product of cognitive processing, by memory and perhaps imagination as
well, of (repeated) sense-impressions.8 That is why he sketches the hierar-
chy of cognitive faculties from the simplest of animals through increasing
levels of complexity all the way to humans. Experience, on this conception,
is thus something mental, to be explained as far as possible in terms of the
operation of lower-level cognitive or precognitive processes.
II. THE ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE
Before Aristotle is done with Metaph. A.1, he articulates a different con-
ception of experience that is neither mentalist nor reductive. He begins
by likening experience to art and science (981a1–2: homoion). All three
seem largely indistinguishable in practical affairs (981a12–13); the only
distinction among them worth mentioning is that people with experience
are often more proficient than those who have theory but no experience:
expertos magis proficere videmus sine experientia rationem habentibus (981a13–
14: mallon epitunchanousin hoi empeiroi toˆn aneu teˆs empeirias logou echont -on).
For example, the old nurse does better than the novice resident intern.
Aristotle explains this away by claiming that action, like experience, has to
do with particulars, putting those with art and science at a disadvantage,
if anything, since they must learn how to apply their universal knowledge
(981a3–12 and 981a14–24). Furthermore, Aristotle argues, art and science
are closer to wisdom than is experience, since people with experience know
only that something is so but not why it is so: ipsum quia sciunt sed propter
quid nesciunt (981a28–29: to hoti men isasi, dioti d’ ouk isasin). Knowledge of
causes comes closer to wisdom than mere knowledge of facts. Aristotle
therefore dismisses experience and concentrates on art and science as
finalists for the role of wisdom, or, at least, what we ordinarily understand
to be wisdom (981b28: hupolambanousi pantes), and so ends A.1.
8. There is no small difference between these versions: the former takes ex-
perience to be a manifold of impressions, the latter an impression of a manifold.
We will look at some mediaeval accounts of how the former becomes the latter in
experience in Section 3.
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Experience, in this second sense, is something that rivals art and sci-
ence as a form of knowledge. Even Aristotle, who wants to argue for the
superiority of art and science, admits that people with experience of this
sort typically do as well as or better than people equipped with theory
alone. What is more, even if we grant Aristotle his further contention that
experience is not the highest form of knowledge, it is nonetheless a form of
knowledge, not merely its raw material (as it is on the traditional conception
of experience), and certainly not something reductively explicable in terms
of atomic sense-impressions. The alternative conception is much closer to
the root meaning of experientia/empeiria: acquired skillfulness, competence,
expertise.9 Aristotle’s concerns make sense when experience is thought of in
this way. Should charge of the platoon be given to the sergeant who has risen
through the ranks or to the lieutenant fresh from OCS? Should psychiatrists
have medical degrees or are “lay analysts” sufficiently qualified? Is on-the-
job training as good as an MBA? These questions only make sense if we
understand experience along the alternative lines Aristotle sketches here.
His preferred example of such experience is drawn from medicine, having
to do with the sort of practical knowledge that a nurse or a lay practitioner
might have.10 However, it is easy to think of other competencies that fit
the model: the auto mechanic who can fix anything; native speakers of a
language; sailors who are “old salts”; chess champions; self-taught musicians
ignorant of theory; corporate executives who have worked their way up from
the mailroom; wrestlers; executive secretaries—the list goes on and on, even
without taking into consideration task-directed skills (touch-typing, driving
a car, riding a bicycle, hunting, and so on).
While it is hard to deny that such people have knowledge, it is also
hard to see their expertise in ‘mentalistic’ or reductive terms. People ac-
quire competencies by interacting with the world, to be sure, but we do not
profitably explain their expertise by reference to their mental states, much
less by constructing it from isolated sense-impressions. The wrestler’s ability
to overcome his opponent is not best seen as something fundamentally
‘in the head,’ and, while the mechanic has had more sense-impressions of
Buicks than other people, only a philosopher in the grip of a theory would
insist that it is the sheer quantity, or remembered quantity, of such Buick-
impressions that best explains his expertise. Likewise, the last fifty years of
research in the philosophy of language should have cured us of the idea that
linguistic competence is a function of inner episodes of private meaning, a
claim that generalizes to cover other competencies, which likewise do not
9. Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. empeirazoˆ; The Oxford Latin
Dictionary, s.v. experior.
10. Aristotle assumes that physicians have theoretical knowledge of why their
therapeutic techniques are effective. This seems overly optimistic as well as unrealis-
tic. We know that aspirin is a general analgesic, for instance, but we do not know why
it works, much less have a “grasp of the universal” (presumably a mix of biochemistry
and neurophysiology).
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depend on private inner episodes. Knowing how to do something does not
depend on a prior mental grasp of knowing that various propositions are
true. If anything, the opposite holds. Aristotle’s claim that such competen-
cies do not involve the (overt) grasp of universals arguably makes the same
point—that is, that such competencies are not best explained by agents
(consciously) following internalized general rules.11 Experience as a matter
of expertise, then, is an alternative paradigm that is neither mentalist nor
reductive.
This alternative conception of experience does not emerge as clearly
as it might from Aristotle’s text, in part because Aristotle wants to eliminate
it as a candidate for wisdom. His second claim, that competencies involve
only knowledge of facts but not causes, and his unstated assumption that
competencies can be superseded by explicit or overt theories, are part of
his argument against expertise and not part of his conception of it; we
may endorse or reject these further claims as we see fit.12 However, we
should not let them obscure the underlying construal of experience as
acquired skillfulness. It is a real alternative to the traditional conception of
experience.
Philosophers have by and large gone along with Aristotle in preferring
to work with the traditional conception of experience.13 Yet the alternative
conception does periodically share in the spotlight.
In the first decades of the twelfth century, Hugh of St. Victor (†1141),
in his remarkable Didascalion, he maintains that there are four branches
11. The general failure of so-called “rule-based” expert systems in modern arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) research, and the promising start to nonreductionist neural-
net models of learning and competence, suggest that thinking of experience along
these lines can be a profitable way to approach issues in cognitive psychology. Already
in the Middle Ages, Hugh of St. Victor suggested further that art and science are
parasitic on varieties of expertise, just as grammar only emerges long after people
are competent native speakers (Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon de studio legendi,
ed. Charles Henry Buttimer [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1939],
1.11).
12. Aristotle’s contention that competencies rely on knowledge of facts rather
than knowledge of causes is shaky at best. The mechanic who can diagnose an engine
problem by listening to the sounds it makes, the musical performer who is able to
play something on an instrument upon hearing it, the nurse who knows what the
patient needs require more than mere ‘factual’ knowledge, and arguably a grasp of
(nonuniversal?) causes: what engine condition produces those noises, which finger-
position on the instrument makes that particular sound, what a given ailment calls
for. Likewise, we have seen reasons above to question Aristotle’s assumption that
competencies can be successfully replaced by theoretical knowledge.
13. Aristotle himself arguably does not do so. His conception of the phronimos
can fruitfully be understood as an example of skillful expertise (in moral matters).
He aligns this with the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge,
though, making it hard to see how certain components of his ethical theory can be
understood (e.g., the doctrine of the mean) since they seem to involve the grasp of
universals in some sense.
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of knowledge (scientia): theoretical, practical, mechanical, and logical. The
artes mechanicae are “the third part of philosophy,” seven in number (2.20),
comprising textiles (2.21 lanificium), weaponry (2.22 armatura), commerce
(2.23 navigatio), farming (2.24 agricultura), hunting (2.25 venatio), medicine
(2.26 medicina), and entertainment (2.27 theatrica).14 Hugh takes the cate-
gories broadly: “weaponry,” for example, covers armaments, architecture,
metalworking and carpentry, engineering, and the like. He also describes
the tools, materials, and craft techniques in common use for a given mechan-
ical art. Textiles, for instance, includes the techniques of weaving, sewing,
and twisting that are accomplished by hand, needle, spindle, awl, comb,
or loom, working on flax, fleece, animal hide, cane, cork, rushes, straw,
and so on, typically producing blankets, saddles, clothing, nets, curtains,
baskets, and similar products. Throughout his discussion, Hugh shows a
lively awareness of the varied kinds of skills and competencies that enter
into expertise in a given mechanical art. His discussion of them proved
decisive for the later Middle Ages.15 Robert Kilwardby later offers a close
paraphrase of Hugh’s discussion of the mechanical arts as a form of knowl-
edge (De ortu scientiarum 39.363–71). Bonaventure makes mention of them
as part of his all-embracing classification of knowledge, designed to show its
subordination to theology (De reductione artium ad theologiam 2).
Albert the Great treats the mechanical arts while glossing Metaph. A.1,
recognizing that they embody the alternative conception of experience
Aristotle takes up here. The mechanical arts, Albert informs us, are pursued
not for their own sake but for the sake of their usefulness, and hence are
less admirable than forms of knowledge that are pursued to govern our
action or even for their own sake (Metaph. 1.1.10). The mechanical arts
are properly human, however—apes can provide brief parodies of human
competencies by imitation, but no more (Metaph. 1.1.6). Albert sides with
Aristotle in dismissing such forms of expertise as a matter of knowing that
something is so rather than why it is so, aligning this with the distinction
in objects of knowledge between the particular and the universal (Metaph.
14. The singular form, ars mechanica, was used in antiquity to refer to what we
now call mechanics; the plural was unknown, apparently used in the broad sense for
the first time in the ninth century by John Scottus Eriugena in his notes on Martianus
Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (see Elspeth Whitney, Paradise Restored: The
Mechanical Arts from Antiquity through the Thirteenth Century [Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 1990], pp. 70–71).
15. See George Ovitt, Jr. The Restoration of Perfection: Labor and Technology in
Medieval Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1987) and especially
Whitney, Paradise Restored, for evidence to back up this claim. Not all philosophers
were receptive: Aquinas stigmatizes the artes mechanicae as “servile” (Summa theologiae
[ST] Ia-IIae q. 57 art. 3 ad 3). Nor were other important figures always sympathetic.
Innocent III’s De contemptu mundi sec. 14 contains a devastating survey of the empti-
ness and vanity of all human activities, including the practice of the mechanical
arts.
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1.1.9); however, he qualifies his conclusion by trying to say something about
the different kind of knowledge involved in expertise.16
At the beginning of the High Middle Ages, then, there is a lively aware-
ness of the two different conceptions of experience as found in A.1. I will
next examine the way in which mediaeval philosophers treated each, con-
centrating on points where the tension between the two conceptions comes
to the fore.
III. REASON IN EXPERIENCE
Aristotle’s presentation of the traditional conception of experience is im-
precise at many points, but perhaps nowhere more so than on the question
whether animals also have experience: they are said to “share little” in it, a
phrase that could be taken either positively or negatively.17 Yet the question
whether animals have experience is more pressing than it might at first
seem, since it turns on whether reason is necessary for experience, and
if so, how. Animals undeniably have sense-impressions and, since they be-
come habituated to pursuit or avoidance through repeated exposure to the
world, they must have memory as well.18 Yet this history is not sufficient for
experience, argues Albert the Great, because the manifold of impressions
must be processed using cognitive faculties animals do not have.
Albert argues that, in order to have knowledge through experience,
there have to be at least three separate mental events: an impression of an
item, an impression of another item that is similar to the first, and an act
of taking the two preceding impressions, at least one of which is recalled
from memory, to be instances of the same universal, which can only happen
through reason.19 This ‘act of taking’ (tentio), though not conscious, struc-
tures our remembered impressions into discrete natural kinds depending
on their objects; Albert proposes that it is, so to speak (quasi), the formal
16. I will return to Albert’s discussion of this last point in Section 4.
17. This ambiguity was noted even among the Greek commentators. Alexander
of Aphrodisias, for example, maintains in his commentary that animals do not have
experience, since mikron can carry the sense “not at all” (Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in
Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, ed. Michael Hayduck, Commentarii in Aristotelem
graecem, vol. 1 [Berlin, 1891], 4.13–23).
18. Aquinas, In Metaph. 1.1.15; see also 1.1.17.
19. Albert, Metaph. 1.1.6 (8.65–75):
Sed cum non perficiatur per unicam sensibilium apprehensionem sed potius ex
duobus aliis cum isto, quorum unum est tentio sensibilium acceptorum similium,
eo quod universale est una de multis essentialiter similibus acceptio, tentio autem
prius accepti cum posterius accepto et horum duorum cum tertio et quarto et
deinceps acceptis non fit nisi per memoriam et una acceptio de omnibus his non
fit nisi per rationem . . .
See also 1.1.9 (13.8–10): experientia est cognitio singularium ex multiplicatis
accepta memoriis, circa quae est actus.
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component of experience, whereas remembered impressions are its matter
(10.11–14). The result is ‘experience’ of the world as divided into natural
kinds.
John of Jandun, who follows Albert closely in his questions on Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, explicitly asks both how memory arises from sense (In Metaph.
q. 10) and how experience arises from memory (q. 11).20 In the former
case, John argues, sense is not the material cause of memory—that is, sense-
impressions are not ‘matter’ that is combined with recollection, or perhaps
‘being recollected,’ as some sort of ‘form’ (as “among acts of different
powers one is not the matter of another”21); rather, sense-impressions are
motive and efficient causes that are the remote agents whereby memories
are produced, through the operation of intermediate faculties: exterior
sense, interior sense, imagination, and the cogitative power (fol. 7vb). Such
memories are, for John, the matter of experience, as noted above. More
precisely, John argues that the impressed species, first in the memorative
power and then in the cogitative power, is the material cause of experience
(fol. 8rb). The formal cause is the comparison of these singular impressed
species with one another.
The ontology underlying Albert’s account is uncompromisingly realist,
a fact made fully explicit by John. Albert maintains that universals are “mixed
in” and “fused together” with singulars (confusi et permixti); the universal is
“the being of many” (esse multorum), pertaining to them all (Metaph. 1.1.7).
The mind separates it from singulars by “purifying” it (11.38: depuratio), or,
as we might say, through abstraction. The link between universals mixed
in with singulars and universals abstracted by the mind is, of course, their
presence in sense-impressions. The sensing of an item results in a sense-
impression of that item being the kind of thing it is, and reason takes
sense-impressions that incorporate or embody the same universal together.
The ‘act of taking’ here is the same as that described in the preceding
paragraph, with the additional detail that sense-impressions are sorted by
the abstractive function of reason.
Albert offers no further details about this process; however, his former
student, Thomas Aquinas, proposes in his commentary on Metaphysics A.1
20. Robert Grosseteste, commenting on Aristotle’s parallel remarks in Posterior
Analytics B.19, writes that sense and memory “are common to brute animals and
rational beings, but in rational beings it happens that experience arises from many
memories once reason has been stirred up” (Grosseteste: Robertus Grosseteste commen-
tarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros Aristotelis. Introduzione e testo critico di Pietro
Rossi. Corpus philosophicorum Medii Aevi. Testi e studi, tom.2. [Firenze: Unione
Accademica Nazionale, 1981], 404.35–37: contingit ex multis memoriis excitata ratione
fieri experientiam). He does not say why reason gets stirred up, or how it acts after
being stirred up.
21. John applies the same principle later to argue that experience is not the
matter of art and science, since experience occurs in the cogitative power whereas
art and science occur in the intellect: In Metaph. 1 q. 12 fol. 8vb (the incunabulum
has the misprint memoria for scientia in line 4).
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that the comparison or collation of impressions is a function of what he
calls ‘particular reason’ (particularis ratio), that is, reason applied to partic-
ulars (or the sense-impressions thereof), and thereby is proper to humans
(In Metaph. 1.1.15).22 Aquinas argues that, since the forms of material ob-
jects (given in the sensible species or the phantasm) are only potentially
and not actually intelligible, there must be an active principle which makes
them actually intelligible, and this reduction from potency to act requires
an agent cause, which Aquinas identifies as the agent intellect. The agent
intellect has two distinct and logically sequential functions: (a) preparing
the sensible species so that it is actually intelligible; (b) “impressing” this
prepared sensible species, called the ‘intelligible species,’ on the possible
intellect (ST Ia q. 79 art. 3).
Aquinas further justifies his claim that the forms of material objects are
only potentially and not actually intelligible by taking the intelligible species
to consist in the universal formal features of the object, which, of course,
are not actually intelligible, since they are not apparent to sense. Sense,
thus, has as its medium the sensible species, which is particular, and the
intellect has as its medium the intelligible species, which is universal. Medi-
ation between the two takes place through abstraction, that is, by removing
the individualizing conditions from the particular sensible species.23 These
individuating conditions do not alter the formal content of the nature of the
object they individuate but merely render it singular, distinct from others
of the same kind; formal differences only occur at the specific and generic
levels. Hence, the process of abstraction does not formally alter the nature,
but simply removes or cancels its surrounding individuating conditions. Yet
because the individuating conditions do not alter the content of the form
22. Aquinas tells us that particular reason is the human correlate of the vis
aestimativa in animals (In Metaph. 1.1.15). Elsewhere, he states that it is some-
times called the ‘cogitative power’ and is localized in the midbrain (ST Ia q. 78
art. 4; see also q. 81 art. 3). Oddly, he does not explicitly link particular reason to
abstraction in his discussion of A.1.
23. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia q. 54 art. 4, q. 79 art. 3–4, q. 84 art. 2 and art. 6, q. 85
art. 1, q. 86 art. 1; Summa contra gentiles 2.77; De spiritualibus creaturis art. 10 ad 4 and
ad 17; Quaestiones disputatae de anima art. 4; De veritate q. 10 art. 6 ad 2 and ad 7;
In De anima 3 lect. 8 and lect. 10; De unitate intellectus n. 111. Note the ambiguity
between “removing individuating conditions from the item represented in the sen-
sible species” and “removing the conditions that individuate one sensible species
from another” (a distinction Aquinas sometimes fluffs). While holding that matter
is responsible for individuation, Aquinas seems to have changed his mind about
whether so-called designated or undesignated matter is the principle of individua-
tion. Because the senses take on the form of the material object without its matter,
there is a problem in individualizing the sensible species. (Aquinas’s offhand remark
in ST Ia q. 75 art. 6 that the senses operate sub hic et nunc suggests a possible way
out: the individualization accomplished by material conditions combined with the
form in the external thing might correspond to the individualizing conditions of
here-and-now combined with the form in the sensing). However, nothing turns here
on the precise details of his account of individuation.
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in the individual, the form in itself must have the abstracted features, that
is, the characteristics revealed through abstraction, though in combination
with the appropriate principle of individuation the form is individualized
in the object: the form in itself is universal. The end result is that ‘reason’
(in the person of the agent intellect) automatically removes individuating
conditions from the sensible species, allowing the human mind to have ex-
perience of a world that is divided into distinct natural kinds, and all of this
takes place prior to conscious experience—in sum, a mediaeval ‘abstractivist’
version of Kant’s transcendental machinery.
Whether the sort of classical concept abstractivism sketched above is
an adequate psychological account is a question I will not explore here. It
is enough that it explains why reason is required for experience such that
non-reasoning animals are left out of account, or, more exactly, why reason
is required for the mediaeval version of the traditional conception of expe-
rience. It is worth noting, however, how heavily indebted the abstractivist
account is to a kind of realism about universals. The more attention paid
to the knowledge of singulars and the more antirealist arguments ventured
on behalf of nominalism, the less plausible the abstractivist line will be, and
likewise the theory of experience it underwrites.
Although I will return to these points at the end of the next section, it is
worth noting here that even in the defense and elaboration of the traditional
conception of experience, the alternative conception raises its head. John
of Jandun applies Albert’s analysis to animals, and concludes that, while
they may have experience in a material sense (namely the ‘memorative
species’), they cannot have experience formally as they lack reason, which
is required for the comparison of impressions mentioned above (collatio:
In Metaph. 1 q. 9 fol. 7va). Experience in the material sense is sufficient,
though, for mere habituation; as John puts it pithily: “we see that the horse
usually returns to the stable.” Aquinas, as we should expect, also holds
that animals have mere habituation (consuetudo) rather than experience (In
Metaph. 1.1.15–16); repeated exposure leads to their “easy and correct”
behavior but no more (1.1.17).
Yet the difficulty with the line taken by Jandun and Aquinas is that
it seems not to respect the facts. Habituation is not enough. Animals do
not merely respond to sensible properties of the objects they encounter
but act as though they have some (limited) competence in getting around
in the world. The horse figures out the fastest way to the stable; the dog
herds the sheep effectively; the fox knows how to avoid the hunter’s traps.
John reasons that animals must therefore have “something similar to the
formal principle of experience,” but says nothing about its nature—a re-
markably lame conclusion.24 Duns Scotus recognizes animal competence
24. John of Jandun, in Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae. Venetiis apud
Hieronymum Scotum (1553; Frankfurt-am-Main: Minerva, 1966), 1 q. 9 (fol. 7va),
makes matters worse by further claiming that this conclusion is de se nota.
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(In Metaph. 1.3.10) but denies that it requires us to ascribe human-like cogni-
tive states to animals: “the exterior acts of [humans and animals] resemble
each other” but “they are not masters of their actions in the same way”
(1.3.11), since animals, despite appearances, act as they do out of necessity
(1.3.14). He then explains the sensitivity to circumstances characteristic of
acquired skill by the different histories of the individual animals involved
(1.3.15). Recognizing the weakness of his case, though, he suggests that
“there is another way of preserving Aristotle’s intention,” namely by holding
that animals sometimes seek what is absent (for example) out of imagining
the absent object as suitable for it (1.3.17–20). So interpreted, animal be-
havior is very similar to non-deliberative human behavior, and, at that point,
Scotus drops the discussion. The inconclusive nature of his discussion, if
nothing else, shows that the alternative conception of experience is not so
easily set aside. I will now turn to some mediaeval discussions in which it is
directly on the table.
IV. “EXPERIENCE A PLUS”
Aristotle admits that experience as acquired skillfulness is a worthy competi-
tor to art and science, and, indeed, that people with such expertise outdo
those who have ‘theoretical’ knowledge but lack hands-on training. As we
have seen, Aristotle does not try to explain this difference in terms of low-
level cognitive processing of isolated sense-impressions, as the traditional
conception of experience would dictate. Instead, recognizing the alterna-
tive conception of experience at work here, he contends that the reason
experience is a plus on the job is that actions have to do with particulars (the
object of expertise) rather than universals (the object of art and science).
As Aquinas puts it, the advantages normally enjoyed by art and science are
cancelled when action in the world is at stake (In Metaph. 1.1.20). Aristotle’s
mediaeval followers are for the most part content to reproduce his line of
reasoning and chalk up practical success to the particular/universal distinc-
tion. However, they differ in explaining just how this distinction explains the
differential success of those with and without experience. Moreover, at least
some philosophers are prepared to recognize certain distinctive features of
experience as acquired skillfulness—all the while maintaining its cognitive
inferiority to art and science, of course.
Aquinas takes Aristotle’s explanation to work as follows. Recall the
example of the old nurse and the young intern. The young intern must
take theoretical medical knowledge and use it to accompish a particular
end in the world, namely healing. Medical science, presumably, consists of
value-neutral propositions about health and illness, or less determinately
about physiology, anatomy, biochemistry, and the like. But healing, and
for that matter poisoning too, “belongs to the singular essentially and the
universal accidentally,” since it is, after all, this person who is healed: Socrates
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is cured (or harmed), and only incidentally is ‘man’ (the universal) affected
(In Metaph. 1.1.22). The old nurse is well-acquainted with all the particulars,
but the young intern is much more liable to make a mistake in applying
only theoretical knowledge for a (merely) practical end.
As far as it goes, Aquinas’s version of the differential success of peo-
ple with and without experience is clear, and it follows Aristotle closely.
However, it does not go far enough. Like Aristotle, Aquinas leaves the fun-
damental question unsolved, and, indeed, unaddressed. What is it about the
application of a theoretical science that makes mistakes more likely than
mere ‘acquaintance with particulars’ would? John of Jandun, following the
same train of thought, suggests that it is the mere fact of application that
introduces the greater likelihood of error. He tells us that causes act “more
swiftly and certainly” the closer they are to their effects (In Metaph. 1 q. 14
fol. 10rb). Yet, even if we grant John this claim, much work remains to
turn it into a satisfactory answer. Why should a cause be more ‘certain’ if
closer? What kinds of mistakes are the result of ‘distance’ from the effect?
Contrast this case with the theoretical physicist, who can apply his theory
to many real-world cases with scarcely a hitch. What is it about medical sci-
ence, or its practitioners, that makes determining a pharmaceutical dosage
fundamentally different from calculating the trajectory of a missile?
Duns Scotus, perhaps recognizing the difficulty in cashing out John’s
metaphor of closeness and distance among causes, takes a different tack.
Aristotle’s overall explanation is still correct in that the difference between
particulars and universals is the key factor, but, Scotus thinks, the culprit
is not the abstractness of theoretical knowledge; rather, it is the richness
of the particular: “in the singular with which the operation is concerned
per se, there are many factors besides the individuated nature of what is
common, and they diversify the action” (In Metaph. 1.5.19). A given patient
in a particular set of circumstances (annexa) has to be treated in one way;
a patient in a different set of circumstances, even if suffering from the
same kind of malady, has to be treated in a different way. The old nurse
is familiar with the surrounding circumstances by repeated exposure to
them (ex multiplicata cognitione singularium), both in themselves and as they
pertain to the patient. The young intern, however, need not know about such
circumstances, at least qua medical science.25 While the intern’s theoretical
knowledge is complete, and, for all Scotus says, can be applied properly,
25. Scotus writes: Haec autem annexa non oportet artificem cognoscere ex hoc solo quod
est artifex (Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicorum libros Aristotelis, in B. Ioannis Duns
Scoti opera philosophica, ed. Girard J. Etzkorn et al., vols. 3–4 [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.,
Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997–], 1.5.19). Currently, we are likely tempted
to think that such circumstances are and should be a part of “medical science” (e.g.,
a certain kind of drug should not be given in tropical climates), but it is hard to fit
this into the mould of Aristotelian demonstrative science, concerned with necessary
connections among universals.
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the intern lacks the sort of knowledge the old nurse has: practical skill and
expertise.
Scotus’s account, unlike Thomas’s or John’s, gives room to expertise
as a form of knowledge complementary to bare knowledge of theoretical
principles, and seems to have supplanted theirs as the preferred expla-
nation of why experience is a plus. Later in the fourteenth century, we
find Jean Buridan, for example, endorsing an essentially Scotist account.
Buridan takes “perfect” science to include theoretical knowledge as well
as knowledge gained from experience, that is, expertise; merely learning
things out of books or through lectures, “the way they do at Paris,” gives
one imperfect knowledge at best (In Metaph. 1 q. 8 fol. 7vb).26 The old
nurse is familiar with the surrounding circumstances, which are the ground
of proficiency. Furthermore, the old nurse is accustomed to noticing indi-
vidual differences, unlike the young intern, and this habit, combined with
knowledge of circumstances, is enough to explain why experience outdoes
the intern’s mere “booklearning.”
Scotus and Buridan recognize that some competencies are matters of
acquired skills, and that they call for special kinds of experience. Any mu-
sician who plays a stringed instrument, for example, has physically trained
the fingers and the muscles of the hand, wrist, and arm in order to play the
instrument. 27 This sort of knowledge is necessary for musical performance
and can only be attained through practice. (Theoretical knowledge about
finger-placement and the like is not part of music theory proper, and, in
any event, cannot take the place of actual playing.) Scotus and Buridan,
like Aristotle, do not think that this sort of expertise is a threat to the
primacy of theoretical knowledge, however. Aristotle’s further contention
that acquired skillfulness is a matter of knowing facts rather than causes has
some plausibility for physical skills, at stake here.28 Yet, even if we grant this
contention, there is more to say about how experience can be a plus even
if it is not a matter of theoretical causal knowledge.
Albert the Great proposes that competencies are not intrinsically
concerned with causal knowledge. He makes his remarks while discussing
26. Jean Buridan adds that even if relevant circumstances are included in theo-
retical studies, they are nevertheless not treated uniformly: they are put “under one
heading in one book and under another in another, so that the student of the art
can’t grasp and combine all the requisite circumstances quickly and properly” (In
Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones argutissimae Magistri Iohannis Buridani, in ultima
praelectione ab ipso recognitae et emissae, Paris 1518; repr. by Minerva G.m.b.H. as
Kommentar zu¨r Aristotelischen Metaphysik [Frankfurt-am-Main, 1964], fol. 7vb: seorsum
in uno libro de una et in alio de altera, ideo talis artifex non potest bene et cito percipere
et combinare omnes circumstantias requisitas), which is one of the abilities provided by
expertise.
27. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 1.5.19, in membro quo agit, ut citharista exercitatus in
manu; Buridan, In Metaph. 1 q. 8 fol. 7vb, experti habent iam membras et organa habilitata.
28. As noted in Section 2, even this contention is dubious, but I will grant it
here for the sake of the argument.
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Aristotle’s claim that the master-artist, who directs the actions of experi-
enced subordinates according to the knowledge of why things must be done
a certain way, is exercising a kind of theoretical knowledge. In contrast, the
artist’s subordinates, who lack this knowledge, are no better than tools or
machines (inanimata). Albert endorses Aristotle’s reasoning, but tries to say
something about the kind of competence that a subordinate might have
(Metaph. 1.1.9 [14.17–39]):
Thus master-artists know more than those who are called subordinates,
who do not consider the material cause in what is made by their art, or
the efficient cause, or by which motions it is fashioned, but only take
into account the species or the form of its shape and make use of these
features in their activities, the way a soldier uses a sword or a sailor
uses an oar. . . . They only work with the use of the form as applied to
action. . . . Now they have some cognition, since they know the species
(not as something extracted from or impressed upon matter by the
activity of an efficient cause but qua pertaining to activities proper to
that species), yet they work with it as from a form to which they are
accustomed, which is acquired by usage, and this is targeted for the
most part at their work.29
Albert’s point is that the soldier knows how to use a sword: he knows
the kind of thing it is (the point of Albert’s talk of species sive forma figurae)
and, more importantly, how it fits into his activities. He does not care about
what the sword was made of, how to make swords, or anything other than
its fitness for a particular purpose.30 Even then the soldier’s interest is not
obviously a matter of means-ends practical deliberation. Instead, the sword
is equipment that is part of the soldier’s life; he is accustomed to the sword,
having it available and ready to hand, and he wields it with a competence
born of practice.31 The soldier’s expertise belongs to a very different order
from the theoretical knowledge of the master-artist, as Albert describes it.
It is not causal knowledge at all. Instead, it is the kind of experience—here,
deadly combat experience—that is itself knowledge.
29. Hi ergo magis sciunt quam hi qui dicitur manu-artifices sive usuales, qui
non materiam et efficientem et quibus motibus fiat considerant in artificiato,
sed tantum speciem sive formam figurae, et illa utuntur in opere, sicut militaris
utitur gladio et nautica temone . . . usuales sive manu-artifices non operantur
nisi usu formae ad actum . . . Sed manu-artifices, licet aliquid habeant cogni-
tionis quia cognoscunt speciem, non quidem prout ex materia vel in materia
inducitur motibus efficientis sed prout refertur ad opus illi speciei proprium,
tamen operantur sicut ex forma consuetudinali, quae usu acquiritur, et hoc
magis determinatur ad opus.
I have altered Geyer’s punctuation in several places.
30. The sword’s fitness can be affected by what it is made of, how it is shaped,
and so on, in which case, the soldier must take notice of these points, although not
for their intrinsic interest.
31. See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit I.iii.14A (68–72), on equipment.
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The traditional conception of experience has to be linked to our knowl-
edge of the world. Because it provides the raw material for knowledge-
claims, it does not also justify them, or does so only to the extent that
we think the formulation of such claims to be an ‘automatic’ process (as
sketched in Section III). The more skeptical we are about such claims, the
greater the jump from traditional experience to knowledge will seem to
be. First, we might come to doubt the underlying metaphysical realism,
and hence the underpinnings of classical concept abstractivism. Second, we
might think that our experience of the world is primarily an experience of
singular things rather than kinds of things.
The drift under High Scholasticism seems to have been to recognize
the justice of these two points, and to try to work out an account of knowl-
edge flexible enough to allow for singular cognition but strong enough
to ground Aristotelian science. Unfortunately, the better the account of
singular knowledge, worked out in the theory of intuitive and abstractive
cognition, the worse the prospects for grounding knowledge seemed to be.
Difficulties in the traditional conception of experience came to the fore.32
Duns Scotus, for example, canvasses Mill’s Methods as a way of securing
inductive knowledge (In Metaph. 1.4.70–82), and he worried about Hume’s
‘missing shade of blue’ example: how can someone who has never had
experience of a particular shade of blue—indigo, according to Scotus—
apparently have knowledge of it?33 Skeptical challenges to the justification
of knowledge, long absent from the philosophical agenda, were raised anew
at the end of the thirteenth century, and responses ranged from attempts
to securely ground our knowledge to shrugging off the question—none of
which seemed satisfactory.34 The project of justifying knowledge on the basis
32. See Tachau, Vision and Certitude, and Pasnau, Theories of Cognition.
33. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 1.4.93–94. Hume presents the example at the end
of Treatise 1.1.1: “Suppose therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years,
and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting
one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet
with . . . ” Scotus’s reply depends on his modal distinction, described in Ordinatio 1
d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 nn. 138–140, and runs roughly as follows. From experience of any
determinate shade of blue we grasp a nature (‘blueness’) capable of increase or
diminution along a continuous scale, which we can perform mentally; indigo is, in
the end, just a certain amount of blueness. Hume by contrast holds that a given
shade is a “simple nature” in its own right and therefore not able to be grasped
through a complex idea; he proposes a solution based on the imperfect operations
of our psychological faculties, if nothing else a less elegant account than Scotus’s.
34. Scotus tries to ground ‘experiential’ knowledge of principles by combining
singular propositions known through sense with analytic propositions, so that, for
example, we know that a stick partially submerged in water and apparently bent is in
fact straight by combining the sense-impression that the stick feels straight with the
proposition “No harder object is broken by contact with something soft that gives way
to it” (Ordinatio 1 d. 3 p. 1 q. 4; see also In Metaph. 1.4.49). The problem, of course,
is in knowing that the sense-impression falls under the principle. At the opposite
pole, Jean Buridan dismisses skeptical worries as simply unanswerable, chalking up
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of experience, apparently mandated by Aristotle, seemed to have come to
a standstill.
V. OCKHAM’S REVOLUTION
Ockham tries to break out of this apparent impasse by basing his philosoph-
ical system on the alternative conception of experience as knowledge rather
than on the traditional philosophical conception. Since ‘experience’ on the
alternative reading is already a form of knowledge, he could sidestep skepti-
cal worries; since it is nonmentalist and antireductive, he could jettison the
complex causal accounts of psychological processes that his predecessors
put forward. Instead, Ockham could sketch an account of mental activity
that used a bare minimum of ‘internal machinery’ and introduce a new
way of talking about our competence in interacting with the world, namely
through habits (habitus), or, as we might say now, complex sets of interlock-
ing abilities.
Not that Ockham set out to do this. The evolution of his philosophical
psychology has been well-documented, and we can trace particular dialecti-
cal exchanges with others, such as Walter Chatton, William Crathorn, Peter
Aureol, and John of Reading, that shaped and in some cases sharply altered
Ockham’s views.35 The details of Ockham’s mature psychological theories
were hammered out over perhaps a dozen years at Oxford. In that time he
came to reject mental representationalism in the form of species-theories;
he moved from an act-content-object model of thought to a direct realist
view; he rejected any real distinction among psychological faculties. But his
journey interests me less than his destination, that is, what Ockham thought
in the end was the best and most philosophically defensible account of psy-
chology along Aristotelian lines. Notorious to posterity for his nominalism,
his radical innovations in psychology seem to me equally important, if not
more so.36
general knowledge-claims about the world as the product of an inborn propensity to
generalize from our (insufficient) data: In Metaph. 2 q. 1 (fol. 9rb), Johannis Buridani
Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros, secundum ultimam lecturam, Paris, 1509; repr.
by Minerva as Kommentar zu¨r Aristotelischen Physik (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1968), 1 q. 15
(fol. 19ra), Summulae de dialectica (unpub.; text cited here from Hubert Hubien’s
transcription), 8.5.3; see also Peter King, “Jean Buridan’s Philosophy of Science” in
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18 (1987): 109–32.
35. For detailed accounts of these debates, see Marilyn Adams, William Ockham,
2 vols. (South Bend, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pt. 3; Tachau,
Vision and Certitude, pts. 2–3; Spruit, Species intelligibilis, passim; and Pasnau, Theories
of Cognition, passim.
36. Pasnau reaches a similar conclusion in his concluding chapter, “A New
Form of Knowing”: “Indeed, it is Olivi and Ockham, if anyone, who emerge as
the real advocates of a radically distinct account of cognition” (Theories of Cognition,
p. 290). That does not mean Ockham’s innovations were accepted. A major theme in
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On Ockham’s mature view, human psychological faculties are only
conceptually, not really, distinct: there is only a single entity, the human
soul, which we may talk about as thinking or choosing, as active or passive.37
Because the distinction among mental faculties is merely conceptual, there
do not have to be causal intermediaries that transfer information from one
faculty to another, in particular intermediaries that are representational.
That is, there need not be any species, whether sensible or intelligible.
Any job they might have performed can be accounted for adequately by
postulating habits, Ockham argues.38 Such habits are produced by causal
interaction with the world, to be sure, but this fact does not require a
reductive explanation: “Given a sufficient agent and patient in proximity
to each other, the effect can be postulated without anything further.”39 In
ordinary cases of cognition, Ockham identifies the agent as the external
object and the psychological habit as joint co-causes, one material and the
other immaterial, and he identifies the patient as the intellect; the effect
is the occurent act of understanding. For the formation of the habit, the
agent is the external object and the patient the sensitive and intellective
souls. Hence Ockham simply declares it to be the nature of the soul that an
object is both sensed and understood when it is present (or “in proximity”).
Sensing and understanding are distinct effects of the same cause, the former
proximate and the latter remote; no further detail is required.
Ockham holds that acts of singular intuitive cognition are the building-
blocks of mental life, as Aristotle maintains at the start of Metaph. A.1, but
gives only a cursory description of how they accomplish this end. On his
Tachau’s study is to explain “what did not happen in the fourteenth century: Ockham
did not establish a school of Ockhamists, and he did not succeed in displacing visible
species from accounts of cognition even in Sentences commentaries” (Tachau, Vision
and Certitude, p. xv).
37. See, for instance, Ordinatio 1 d. 3 q. 6 (OTh 2 520.11–13): “The agent
intellect is not distinct from the possible intellect at all; instead, one and the same
intellect is denominated in different ways” (intellectus agens nullo modo distinguitur ab
intellectu possibili sed idem intellectus habet diversas denominationes).
38. Ockham’s classic statement of this thesis is in the first conclusion given in
Reportatio 2 qq. 12–13 (OTh 5 268.2–11). He argues against the need for the species
at length in these questions. (Similar remarks are found in Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 8 and d. 27
q. 2, as well as in his In Isag. 2 and In De int. preface.) In the Reportatio, Ockham
lists the functions typically played by the intelligible species, namely to inform the
intellect, to unite the object with the potency, to determine the potency to the kind
of act, to cause the act of understanding, to represent the object, and to account for
the unity of mover and moved, and in each case argues that the function is either
unnecessary or can be accomplished by a psychological habit. See Spruit, Species
intelligibilis. The same thesis holds for the sensible species: see Tachau, Vision and
Certitude, pp. 130–48.
39. Rep. 2 qq. 12–13: Posito activo sufficienti et passivo in ipsis approximatis, potest
poni effectus sine omni alio (OTh 5 268.7–9).
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view, a sensory intuitive cognition occurs when in the presence of an object,
and, together with the object, cause an intellective intuitive cognition of
that same object; after repeated exposure, the mind is caused to have an
abstractive general concept of that kind of object.40 Along the way, habits are
created, which account for overt acts of memory as well the dispositional
abilities that make up the concept of the object. Yet even adding in the
details of intuitive and abstractive cognition and their ‘foundational’ role,
the most remarkable thing about Ockham’s account of human psychology
is how spartan it is. In effect, he not only refuses to give causal chains in
a typically reductive account of psychology, he does not seem to want to
give a ‘mentalistic’ theory at all. Habits, as Ockham has described them, are
complex packages of interrelated abilities, some of which have to do with
recognizing and identifying singular items or kinds of items; however, they
do not have to be ‘in the head’ in any interesting way; they are predicates
of the whole person as much as they are specifically mental.
The result, a nonreductive psychological theory that dispenses with
mental processes to an unprecedented extent, must have looked extraor-
dinarily odd to Ockham’s fourteenth-century contemporaries—in fact, it
still looks odd to his twenty-first-century commentators. It has always led to
charges that Ockham has made of mental processes a black box, that he
has left unresolved, and even unaddressed, the philosophical problems that
led to the psychological theories he rejects.41 There is some justice in these
complaints. However, they assume that Ockham was trying to explain such
problems on the traditional model of experience, when instead he came to
40. See q. 1 art. 1 and q. 12 of the Prologue to the Ordinatio (OTh 1 16–47 and
355.22–356.14 respectively); Rep. 2 qq. 12–13 (OTh 5 261.7–263.6); In Phys. 1.1.2
(OPh 4 25.123–26.152); Summa logicae 3-2.10 and 3-2.29. In Quaestiones variae q. 5,
Ockham suggests that even a single sensory intuitive cognition might be enough
to cause the abstractive general concept, though he denies this in Quodlibeta 1.13.
The exact form of Ockham’s theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition has been
fiercely debated: see Eleonore Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on
Mediating Species,” in The Cambridge Companion to William of Ockham, ed. Paul Spade
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 168–203; and Elizabeth Karger,
“Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” in The
Cambridge Companion to William of Ockham, pp. 204–26, for recent contributions.
Ockham gives lip service to the foundationalist picture of Metaph. A.1 in his In Isag.
2.11 (OPh 2 45.36–39). The ‘mentalism’ of Mental Language seems to be no more
than a way of talking about the mind in terms of linguistic competence, despite
Ockham’s occasional nods in the direction of compositionality.
41. See esp. John of Reading, Robert Holcot, and Adam Wodeham for medi-
aeval examples of this sort of criticism (Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pt. 3; Spruit,
Species intelligibilis); King, “Scholasticism and the Philosophy of Mind,” and Stump,
“Mechanisms of Cognition,” offer modern versions. Oswald Fuchs, in his The Psychol-
ogy of Habit According to William of Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute
Publications, 1952), makes of Ockham’s ‘psychology of habit’ no more than mere
behaviorism.
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be impressed with human competencies as he found them,42 and tried to
forge a new psychological vocabulary for talking about them (Quodl. 3.20
OTh 9 281.11–17):43
After many acts have been performed we have the physical ability to
carry out similar acts where we weren’t able to do so before (or at least
not as easily), as is clear in the case of scribes, weavers, and other artisans.
Hence something is either added or is taken away in regard to these
abilities; hence something is added, and this I call the habit.
Ockham identifies the competencies exhibited by skillful practitioners of
crafts, acquired through practice, as the sort of thing he has in mind by
introducing talk of ‘habits’ in the first place.
Ockham, unfortunately, did not leave behind a commentary or ques-
tions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, so it is hard to prove that he was motivated
by the alternative conception of experience. Yet in q. 11 of the Prologue
to his Ordinatio, Ockham expressly takes up Metaphysics A.1, explaining pro
intentione Philosophi why experience should be a plus on the job (OTh 1
318.24–320.21). Like Scotus, and Buridan after him, Ockham recognizes
that some competencies are matters of acquired physical skills, and a few,
such as musical performance, arguably consist for the most part in such
skills (propter exercitium organorum exteriorum). Musicians can sometimes even
improve, or “acquire a better intellectual habit,” simply by listening to a
song. But more importantly, Ockham describes how acquired skillfulness
can outdo mere theoretical knowledge (OTh 1 319.13–22):
This can happen in another way, namely when experienced people have
the notion of some singulars and of some universals that other people
do not have an evident notion of. Accordingly, the experienced person
acquires in the course of experience familiarity with many universal
propositions that another person cannot have, though the experienced
person knows only the fact and their cause, whereas another person
who has the art knows the cause in some fashion in the universal or
42. Ockham endorses the standard mediaeval view that animals are merely
“habituated” (Rep. 4 q. 14), explicitly mentioning Metaphysics A.1. He does note,
however, that animals may have a large number of simple habits which, when taken
together, are very much like a complex habit of the sort usually ascribed to humans
(OTh 7 313.2–314.6); the same holds for apparent instances of animal reasoning
and other competencies (315.5–12).
43. Potentia executiva corporalis post multos actos elicitos potest in consimiles
actus, in quos non potuit ante, vel saltem non ita faciliter potuit ante in tales
actus, sicut patet in scriptoribus, textoribus, et aliis artificibus; igitur in illis
potentiis est aliquid additum vel ablatum; igitur est aliquid additum, et illud
voco habitum.
Ockham complements his argument for such ‘physical’ habits with an indepen-
dent argument for intellectual habits at 283.47–56.
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the particular case, as sometimes happens in the hierarchy of the sci-
ences. And since such universal propositions are able to guide people
more immediately than these other more universal propositions, the
experienced person acts more surely [than the inexperienced person
schooled in the art].44
Ockham rejects Aristotle’s contention that the experienced person knows
only particulars. Instead, expertise may involve general truths (‘many uni-
versal propositions’) as well as particular truths. This opens the floodgates
to an alternative approach to questions of knowledge and experience. No
longer is experiential knowledge restricted to particulars; Ockham declares
in no uncertain terms that expertise may be a function of general knowl-
edge, which we find people to have acquired in their histories of getting
around in the world. The alternative paradigm of experience is given an
equal standing with art and science. But with a difference. The traditional
conception of experience requires an inductive leap to the universal in
order to have knowledge strictly speaking, laying it open to intractable
skeptical doubts (as noted at the end of Section IV). The alternative con-
ception, however, begins with knowledgeable people getting around in the
world successfully, and now Ockham allows such expertise to cover the
same ground as scientific knowledge. The only grounds for skeptical doubt
are wholesale: whether our ability to get around in the world successfully
is not fundamentally grounded in the world being as our getting around
takes it to be, which, in the mediaeval context, amounts to asking whether
God could be a wholesale deceiver, a question whose answer was obvious
and uninteresting.45 Perhaps this is why Ockham seems uninterested in
skepticism.46 In connection with Metaphysics A.1, Ockham notes that first
principles known only through experience are intrinsically subject to doubt
(dubitabilia): Summa logicae 3–2.9 (OPh 1 522.19–33). If he were thinking of
the traditional conception of experience, this would have posed a serious
44. Aliter potest hoc contingere, quia experti habent notitiam aliquorum singular-
ium et aliquorum universalium quorum alii non habent evidentiam notitiam.
Unde expertus in experiendo adquirit notitiam multarum propositionum univer-
salium quas alius habere non potest, quamvis expertus nesciat eas per causam sed
tantum quia; et alius—scilicet artifex—aliquo modo novit causam in universali
vel particulari, sicut aliquando contingit in scientia subalternante respectu sub-
alternatae. Et ideo quia tales propositiones universales magis immediate dirigunt
quam aliae universaliores, ideo experti certius operantur.
45. Ockham’s view is that God could deceive us, and so, presumably, could be
a wholesale deceiver (Quodl. 5.5 and Rep. 4.14), and would not be doing anything
wrong in doing so (Rep. 2 qq. 3–4). Nor can we know that God is not doing so,
for His own inscrutable purposes, since our knowledge of God’s will is necessarily
limited. And, for Ockham, that is all there is to say about the issue.
46. See Adams,William Ockham: “Ockham shows much less interest in [skep-
ticism] than the other philosophers we have discussed” (p. 626), viz. Augustine,
Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Nicolaus of Autrecourt.
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philosophical dilemma for him. On the alternative conception, however,
this is no more than to recognize that our competencies do not come with
guarantees.
To allow some principles to be known by experience is not to say that all
principles are known or knowable through experience, of course. Ockham
does not tell us how far he is willing to pursue the implications of his radical
realignment of knowledge and experience. He does explicitly classify several
branches of knowledge, either wholly or in part, as “practical” in nature:
logic, grammar, and rhetoric are purely practical, whereas theology and
medicine are partially practical. Ockham declares the practical nature of the
trivium in no uncertain terms: “I hold that grammar, logic, and rhetoric are
genuinely practical sciences in exactly the way the mechanical arts are gen-
uinely practical.”47 Just as architecture describes how to construct a building
well (but not whether to do so), logic describes how to argue well (149.303–
14). For logic is a tool, and, like any tool in the hands of a craftsman, its use
provides the user with a fuller grasp (notitia) of it.48 It is essentially practical
rather than speculative since it regulates our actions (Expositio preface OPh
2 7.128–38), although the distinction really is a matter of degree rather
than kind (In De int. preface OPh 2 137.53–64), since both practical and
speculative sciences seek truth as their end (Ordinatio Prologue q. 11 OTh
323.12–14). Logic is a matter of devising arguments, drawing distinctions,
and reasoning well in general; a grasp of truth-preserving patterns of infer-
ence comes from practicing these activities—in a word, from experience.
Theology and medicine are ‘mixed’ enterprises, containing speculative and
practical components (Ordinatio Prologue q. 13), though Ockham puts little
stock in the distinction; we could call medicine speculative or practical, since
words are purely conventional (357.21–23).
Ockham does not say anything directly about the nature of psycho-
logical theory, but his account has exactly the features we should expect
it to have were he to embrace the alternative conception of experience as
knowledge. In one of the few passages where he discusses Metaphysics A.1,
Ockham, as we have seen, denies one of Aristotle’s basic theses by admit-
ting skillful expertise to be the equal of traditional scientific knowledge.
Farther than this he does not go: to the best of my knowledge he does not
discuss equipment or the mechanical arts, and in his non-political writings
his concerns are dominated by the philosophical issues common at Oxford
in his day. Yet Ockham went farther than his contemporaries could eas-
ily follow, and his hard-fought attempt to recast traditional philosophical
problems in light of the alternative conception of experience, especially
epistemological worries, seems to have found no followers. His radical shift
47. Summula philosophiae naturalis Preamble (OPh 6 149.298–300): Concedo quod
grammatica, logica et rhetorica sunt vere scientiae practicae, ita vere sicut artes mechanicae
sunt practicae.
48. As Ockham says in his prefatory letter to the Summa logicae (OPh 1 6.9–15).
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to thinking holistically about human competencies, rather than thinking
atomistically about sensory cognition, was too deep a change in outlook for
his contemporaries; in psychology, at least, Ockham was a prophet without
honor in his own century.
The same cannot be said for his nominalism, whose influence was wide
and immediate. Yet there is reason to think that Ockham’s nominalism is
grounded in his philosophy of psychology. When Ockham takes up the
problem of universals in Ordinatio 1 d. 2 qq. 4–8, he ranges the positions
under discussion in order of decreasing realism. The first view he takes up
is the most realist, and he stigmatizes it as “totally false and absurd”; the
next less realist and only “simply false”; the next “unreasonable”; and so
on, until, in q. 8, Ockham concludes that universals “do not exist outside
the soul in any way”—yet Ockham, surprisingly, presents four alternative
accounts of how universals might be ‘concepts’ (things inside the soul)
and does not decide among them. Indeed, he does not seem interested in
the question; after some general remarks on our conceiving Socrates and
Plato as more similar to one another than either is to a donkey, he drops
it entirely. For those who have thought Ockham’s philosophy is ultimately
based on a rigorous nominalism, and that his views about most subjects can
be derived from his ontological parsimoniousness, his positive discussion of
universals is at best an embarrassment, a non-account where an account is
called for. However, if we begin from his competence-based psychology of
habit, Ockham’s lack of interest in the fine details of nominalism becomes
explicable. For we find ourselves in the world with discriminative skills, so
that we do (as a mater of fact) get around by carving the world up into
natural kinds, but with no real explanation of how such habituation takes
place. And this is exactly what Ockham says about universal ‘concepts’: they
are no more than sets of competencies in classifying things together, which
we do, and that’s really all there is to say.49 The chain of reasons comes to
an end in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hugh of St. Victor, at the beginning of the High Middle Ages, tried to
create a new philosophical agenda that included acquired skillfulness as
a constituent part of philosophy. William of Ockham, at the close, tried
to carry that conception into the existing philosophical agenda. Neither
succeeded in radically reforming philosophy. What if they had?
49. In Ordinatio 1 d. 2 q. 7 ad 7 (OTh 2 261.13–20), Ockham tells us that
universal cognition is produced in the soul naturally by interaction with singular
items in the world, although how this happens is hidden from us (occulte); we may
as well take it as given.
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At the least, we would no longer be under the spell of the tradi-
tional conception of experience, whether it be found in Aristotle, British
Empiricism, or recent positivism. The project of justifying knowledge-claims
would be less a matter of providing foundations than recognizing how
knowing is one of the things we humans do as we get around in the world.
And science, as well as the history of science, would have much more to do
with technology and acquired expertise than with ‘philosophical’ precon-
ceptions about “the scope and limits of human knowledge”—a matter of
trying to learn to swim before ever entering the water.
